Social Sciences in China (Chinese Edition)

No. 1, 2026

The Fact-Value Distinction in the Mutual Learning between Chinese and Western Philosophy—An Ethical Naturalist Perspective

(Abstract)

Chen Qiaojian

The divide between facts and values has long been a classic issue in the history of philosophy, and throughout the twentieth century Western philosophers proposed a range of responses. Approaches rooted in the philosophy of language that attempt to derive “ought” from “be” tend to remain confined to linguistic analysis and, as a result, overlook substantive ethical and normative concerns; their argumentative force has likewise proven limited. By contrast, contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism offers a more substantive line of inquiry. Confucian theories of the goodness of human nature can likewise be appropriately interpreted as a form of ethical naturalism. Mainstream ethical naturalist accounts of human nature in both Chinese and Western philosophy hold that human nature is simultaneously factual and normative: what human beings are already contains implications for what they ought to be. The key difference lies in how “what human nature is” is understood. Concisely, Western traditions emphasize rationality, whereas Confucianism accords primacy to moral virtue. As a result, their respective conceptions of the good life and of moral right and wrong display notable distinctions. In the process of mutual learning between Chinese and Western philosophy, drawing on the strengths of Western conceptual analysis can help clarify certain entanglements within Confucian theories of human nature; conversely, the Confucian, virtue-centered conception of human nature can help rectify the one-sided development of rationalist views in Western philosophy.